Consider trust and humility: two things almost universally considered virtuous (all other things being equal).
Trust entails, among other things, having an "innocent until proven guilty" assumption of humans in general. Especially in the context of relationships (be they fraternal, social or romantic), it involves making excuses for the other person and assuming the best of them. In short, trust centers around assuming goodwill of people.
Humility is the antithesis of arrogance. It involves underestimating, to some degree, one's goodness as a human being. Many would feel humility is warranted for all of a person's excellences- a good painter needs to assume, to some extent, that she's not as good a painter as everyone (or she herself sometimes) thinks. But humility is especially important when it comes to ethical values. We need to make the guarded assumption that we really aren't very good people, and there's always room for a lot of improvement. I'm not advocating any original sin-esque argument for personal depravity here. I don't think humans are fundamentally 'depraved', as some religious language would suggest. To be sure, I think it's crucial we have high opinions of ourselves, and appropriate levels of self-esteem. But there also needs to be that guarded, yet conscious, effort to underestimate our goodness. That's what humility is.
It's interesting to note both of these important virtues involve making assumptions. There's really no solid empirically-grounded evidence for our assumption that people are innocent until proven otherwise, or that I'm not actually better than what others think of me. Cynicism and arrogance can be adopted in extreme situations, but they cannot be commended as entire codes to guide our lives by. But there's the rub. There doesn't seem to be any rational ground for preferring trust over cynicism, or humility over arrogance. Sure, one may claim there's no reason to prefer cynicism/arrogance over trust/humility either. But that only goes to show we should, if we want to be rational and "proportion our beliefs to the evidence", as Hume would have it, suspend judgment on people's goodwill and our goodness as human beings, as opposed to making positive assumptions about them. And yet, making these non-evidential assumptions is exactly what trust and humility demand.
I don't think it's just trust and humility either, many other aspects of ethics demand that we have beliefs that exceed the available evidence. I suspect positivity- having an overall positive outlook of the world, belief in some sort of global karmic "you reap what you sow" principle- is virtuous in an important way.
Does all of this, then, mean being virtuous entails being irrational?
Actually, no. These assumptions we make in leading an ethical life are indeed rational, but they involve rationality of a different sort. Meta-ethics philosopher Robert Adams gives the following analogy in one of his essays:
These sorts of reasoning involve practical reasoning, as opposed to the pure or theoretical varieties. We're so used to theoretical or evidential reasoning in discussions of rationality that this rather non-conventional sort may escape our view. But it's 'eminently reasonable', as Adams puts it, to engage in practical reasoning when there are stakes involved, especially when there's precious little evidence to settle the issue either way.
Trust and humility do involve making assumptions without evidences. But look at what's at stake here: the antithesis of these virtues are cynicism and arrogance. These are in general so destructive to our ethical lives that the 'smart', or practical, thing to do would be to steer as clear from them as possible. I don't want to suspend my judgment out of a desire to be rational in a restricted, theoretical way when the choices are trust and cynicism, for example. I want to embrace trust, even if it means getting burned a few times by betrayal (of course, there are limits to this- and being overly trusting of everyone isn't a good thing either). Similarly, I'd rather underestimate my personal goodness if it means staying at a comfortable distance away from arrogance.
So to go back to the question I started with: does being a good person require being irrational? The answer is no, if you're willing to broaden the definitions of conventional rationality a little.
Trust entails, among other things, having an "innocent until proven guilty" assumption of humans in general. Especially in the context of relationships (be they fraternal, social or romantic), it involves making excuses for the other person and assuming the best of them. In short, trust centers around assuming goodwill of people.
Humility is the antithesis of arrogance. It involves underestimating, to some degree, one's goodness as a human being. Many would feel humility is warranted for all of a person's excellences- a good painter needs to assume, to some extent, that she's not as good a painter as everyone (or she herself sometimes) thinks. But humility is especially important when it comes to ethical values. We need to make the guarded assumption that we really aren't very good people, and there's always room for a lot of improvement. I'm not advocating any original sin-esque argument for personal depravity here. I don't think humans are fundamentally 'depraved', as some religious language would suggest. To be sure, I think it's crucial we have high opinions of ourselves, and appropriate levels of self-esteem. But there also needs to be that guarded, yet conscious, effort to underestimate our goodness. That's what humility is.
It's interesting to note both of these important virtues involve making assumptions. There's really no solid empirically-grounded evidence for our assumption that people are innocent until proven otherwise, or that I'm not actually better than what others think of me. Cynicism and arrogance can be adopted in extreme situations, but they cannot be commended as entire codes to guide our lives by. But there's the rub. There doesn't seem to be any rational ground for preferring trust over cynicism, or humility over arrogance. Sure, one may claim there's no reason to prefer cynicism/arrogance over trust/humility either. But that only goes to show we should, if we want to be rational and "proportion our beliefs to the evidence", as Hume would have it, suspend judgment on people's goodwill and our goodness as human beings, as opposed to making positive assumptions about them. And yet, making these non-evidential assumptions is exactly what trust and humility demand.
I don't think it's just trust and humility either, many other aspects of ethics demand that we have beliefs that exceed the available evidence. I suspect positivity- having an overall positive outlook of the world, belief in some sort of global karmic "you reap what you sow" principle- is virtuous in an important way.
Does all of this, then, mean being virtuous entails being irrational?
Actually, no. These assumptions we make in leading an ethical life are indeed rational, but they involve rationality of a different sort. Meta-ethics philosopher Robert Adams gives the following analogy in one of his essays:
These sorts of reasoning involve practical reasoning, as opposed to the pure or theoretical varieties. We're so used to theoretical or evidential reasoning in discussions of rationality that this rather non-conventional sort may escape our view. But it's 'eminently reasonable', as Adams puts it, to engage in practical reasoning when there are stakes involved, especially when there's precious little evidence to settle the issue either way.
Trust and humility do involve making assumptions without evidences. But look at what's at stake here: the antithesis of these virtues are cynicism and arrogance. These are in general so destructive to our ethical lives that the 'smart', or practical, thing to do would be to steer as clear from them as possible. I don't want to suspend my judgment out of a desire to be rational in a restricted, theoretical way when the choices are trust and cynicism, for example. I want to embrace trust, even if it means getting burned a few times by betrayal (of course, there are limits to this- and being overly trusting of everyone isn't a good thing either). Similarly, I'd rather underestimate my personal goodness if it means staying at a comfortable distance away from arrogance.
So to go back to the question I started with: does being a good person require being irrational? The answer is no, if you're willing to broaden the definitions of conventional rationality a little.