I find that often religions provide a justification framework for morals; but not all of them are necessarily right nor are all of them necessarily wrong. What it boils down to is choice; and/or the lack thereof when teaching these morals.
Religion is the problem.
The following example is hypothetical and generalized to convey an idea. Please do not pick on it for those reasons.
I feel you're on to something here, but I'm having difficulty understanding the exact nature of that something. So there are high chances I've misunderstood your view. With this disclaimer in mind, please forgive any remark of mine that is offensive to or ignorant of your position.
First, I would argue that as long as worldviews are concerned, ethics can hardly be separated from metaphysics. So for religion X, the morals it subsumes would only make sense given the truth of its answers to metaphysical questions, like what is our ultimate purpose in life? Whatever answer you provide to this question acts as a premise to ethic-building at the very basic, general level. These "general" ethical questions include concerns of human freedom and to the extent it should be curbed (if at all), the definition of social welfare/stability and the value of freedom of speech and action relative to this definition, and so on. And then you move on to pick out the particulars in applied ethics.
In other words, unless you subscribe to absolute ethical relativism, applied ethics cannot be seen in isolation of meta-ethics (how morality or ethics is grounded).
To apply this tentative analysis to your analogy, I don't think it rational that one would be justified in leaving one's worldview (not just religion, it could be non-theistic worldviews like naturalism as well) just because some morals do not square well with her "personal experiences and feelings". Rather, the correct position to hold- I think- would be to return to how these ethical values are grounded (meta-ethics), or perhaps dig even deeper and try to locate the "problem" in the particular metaphysic. If the metaphysics and (consequently) meta-ethics stand true to the scrutiny of reason, I think it unreasonable -generally speaking- to declare one's position unjustified on the basis of ostensible inconsistency in applied ethics.
This is why in my post, I stressed the importance of reason or justification in holding the beliefs we do. This justification should be carried out by judging the truth claims of the particular metaphysic or meta-ethics, not by judging the consistency of applied ethics with one's personal experiences and feelings. To me, the former seems like stronger grounds to stand on.
All of this is theory of course, and when practical applications are concerned, certain caveats would need to be introduced.
Also, maybe it's entirely my fault but in this thread, the distinction between "holding view X is superior" and "promoting/forcing view X as superior on others" is being muddied. I've thought a lot about this issue, and I don't think mere difference of opinion is the problem. The problem is with people's characters and naivete, when they lock themselves up in their own little bubble and denounce anyone who don't ascribe to their views as immoral. As Livewire very aptly put, a lack of empathy is probably the only reason why these conflicts occur.
A society doesn't have to be uniform in their moral stances in order to be united.